Who is More Tolerant of Political Incivility?

The Role of Gender, Political Ideology, and Media Use

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WHO IS MORE TOLERANT OF POLITICAL INCIVILITY?

Much research investigates the nature and incidence of political incivility and perceptions of incivility (e.g., Sobieraj & Berry, 2011, 2013; Fridkin & Kenney, 2011; Massaro & Stryker, 2012; Muddiman, 2013; Weber Shandwick, KRC Research, & Powell Tate, 2013; Stryker, Conway, & Danielson, 2014; Hmielowski, Hutchens, & Cicchirillo, 2015). Some scholars presume that political incivility, especially by disadvantaged and marginalized persons, is necessary to ensure that democratic decision-making is sufficiently inclusive (e.g., Sapiro, 1999; Mendelberg, 2009; Harcourt, 2012). But most communication and political science researchers emphasize instead how political incivility can harm democracy.

It is well known that a large majority of the American public dislikes political incivility (Fridkin & Kenney, 2011; Public Religion Research Institute, 2010; Weber Shandwick, KRC Research, & Powell Tate 2013). Harmful consequences associated with political incivility include extreme elite partisan polarization, lack of collaboration and gridlock on urgent policy issues, and the political alienation of some citizens and hyper-partisanship of others. Harms also include reduced trust in government, diminished legitimacy of government and of opposing points of view, and heightened negative affect between Republicans and Democrats that, at least among highly committed partisans, spills over to enhance preference for self-segregation in residence, work, and marriage (Jamieson, 1992; Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1997; Mutz, 2006; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011, 2013; Massaro & Stryker, 2012; Pew Research Center, 2014; Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Forgette & Morris, 2006; Mutz & Reeves, 2005; Mutz, 2007; Fridkin & Kenney, 2008; Bishop, 2009; Mann & Ornstein, 2012; Abramowitz, 2013; Hutchens, Cicchirillo, & Hmielowski, 2014). Those with little tolerance for political incivility may avoid politics. Or they may isolate themselves in like-minded communities where they may be less likely to encounter

incivility but also will be less likely to bond or engage in political discussion with others who do not share their political ideology or partisanship (Pew Research Center, 2014). Conversely, those with high tolerance for incivility may contribute disproportionately to hyper-partisanship and political polarization (Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Mutz, 2007; Stryker, 2011).

Despite political incivility's apparently important harmful consequences, only one prior study directly examined factors shaping variable tolerance for political incivility among the public (Fridkin & Kenney, 2011). We use a representative sample of the full population of undergraduates at a large southwestern university to help fill this key gap, investigating how demographic and political factors as well as off-line and on-line media use shape variable tolerance. Focus on a youthful population is useful because youth are the future of American democracy. Our study makes an added contribution: construction of a strong new measure of tolerance for political incivility.

Tolerance for Political Incivility

Unifying Theoretical Premise and Relevant Prior Research

Although almost no research directly examines tolerance for incivility, there is sufficient related literature to ground a strong measure of variable tolerance for political incivility and a set of clear, testable hypotheses pertaining to factors shaping such tolerance. We constructed our measure of tolerance based on prior research conceptualizing and measuring political incivility (see, e.g., Brooks & Geer, 2005; Fridkin & Kenney, 2008; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011, 2013; Massaro & Stryker, 2012; Coe, Kenski, & Rains, 2014; Stryker, Conway, & Danielson, 2016). There are two longstanding empirically supported ideas underlying all our hypotheses about factors shaping tolerance. First, people differ in their sensitivity and response to negative, aversive, or threatening stimuli (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Canli et al., 2001;

Gilligen, 1982; Lind, Hao, & Tyler 1994; Ulbig & Funk, 1999). Second, primary and secondary

political socialization, learning, and acculturation shape diverse political attitudes and behaviors

(Glass, Bengston, & Dunham, 1986; Hanna, 1979; Hanks, 1981; Jennings, Stoker, & Bowers,

2009; Jennings & Niemi, 1968; Manza & Brooks, 1998; Pearson-Merkowitz & Gimpel, 2009;

Sapiro, 1983; Sears & Huddie, 1990; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Based on these two

empirically supported ideas, we offer a unifying theoretical premise. *Differential tolerance for*

political incivility should be shaped by the wide variety of factors that likewise impact other

political attitudes and behaviors by shaping individuals' experiences, socialization, learning,

acculturation, and adaptation to variable normative expectations.

    In a previous study, we used conceptual overlaps in the literature to construct 23 potential

indicators of various types of perceived incivility measured with a five-category Likert scale

from "not at all uncivil" to "very uncivil" (citation held for blind review). We tested these

measures on the same sample used to create our tolerance measure and found that 75% or more

agreed that 22 of these indicators tapped speech/behavior that was very, mostly or somewhat

uncivil.[1] Types of political incivility included, for example, threatening harm, name calling,

attacking a political opponent's person, character or reputation, lying, shouting, refusing to let

those with differing opinions participate in the discussion, and getting in an opponent's

face/violating their personal space (see Table 1). Here, we use latent class analysis (LCA) to

discover the structured variability in our data across this set of indicators. We then use this

structure to construct our measure of tolerance for incivility.

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[1]The exceptional item was issue-oriented attacks. As we hypothesized, a large proportion of
respondents distinguished issue-oriented attacks from personal attacks, finding the former—
essential to spirited democratic debate—civil, and the latter uncivil. Scholars of negative
campaigning also find that issue-oriented attacks elicit different responses than do personal
attacks (Abbe, Hernson, Magelby & Peterson, 2001; Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1997; Fridkin &
Kenney, 2004; Lau & Rovner, 2009; Thurber & Nelson, 2000).

With respect to the two empirically supported ideas undergirding our unifying theoretical premise, the one prior study examining predictors of tolerance for political incivility drew mostly on the first: that because people differ in sensitivity to aversive stimuli, people should likewise differ in tolerance for political incivility (Fridkin & Kenney, 2011). Fridkin and Kenney's (2011) investigation of predictors of tolerance combined data from the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study surveying 1,045 respondents in 21 Senate races with contextual data on campaign advertising. The authors measured tolerance for incivility with a scale based on agreement/disagreement with two survey items: 1) some negative advertisements are so nasty I stop paying attention to what the candidates are saying; and 2) mean-spirited commercials attacking the opponent are appropriate during election campaigns. Modeling predictors of tolerance, they found that those who were more conservative, those with stronger party identification, men, the young, and those more interested in politics were more tolerant of political incivility. Compared to the Fridkin and Kenney (2011) measure of tolerance, our measure makes use of a much larger number of survey questions and each question is more specific in tapping particular types of perceived political incivility.

While not investigating tolerance for political incivility directly or explicitly, others have investigated related phenomena, including perceived acceptability of online flaming (Hmielowski et al., 2015) and propensity to engage in flaming by sub-groups of online media users (Hutchens et al., 2014; Hmielowski et al., 2015). These studies tend to rely on the second empirically supported idea; that pertaining to experiences, socialization and acculturation.[2]

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[2]There also is a large literature on negative campaigning (see review in Stryker, Brosseau, & Schrank, 2011). Much negative messaging also is uncivil, but if issue-based attacks are not perceived as uncivil, not all negative campaigning will be perceived as uncivil. Overall, literature on negative campaigning is less relevant to our purposes, given it focuses mostly on strategic considerations pushing candidates to run negative campaigns.

For example, Hmielowski et al. (2015) found that, the more people discussed politics online, the more they viewed flaming as acceptable and the greater their stated intention to flame. The positive relationship between online political discussion and stated intention to flame was partially mediated by perceived acceptability of flaming. Consistent with literature associating the advent and use of digital technology for political discussion with heightened incivility (e.g., Papacharissi, 2004; Upadhyay, 2010), the authors interpret this as evidence that discussing politics online shapes "developing normative beliefs about what constitutes acceptable online communication behaviors" (Hmielowski et al., 2015, p. 1206). In short, experiencing online political discussion socializes and acculturates people to heightened incivility. The authors measured perceived acceptability of flaming through the extent of agreement with items asking whether it was acceptable "(a) to say aggressive things to people online when discussing politics, (b) to say aggressive things to people who hold different opinions from your own, (c) to insult people who attack your beliefs, and (d) to insult people who hold different opinions from your own" (Hmielowski et al., 2015, p. 1203).[3]

In the following section, we develop specific predictions grounded in our unifying theoretical premise. While we provide a more comprehensive and nuanced measure of tolerance than did Fridkin and Kenney (2011), we have a more localized and demographically restricted population. Like Hmielowski et al. (2015), we use a non-national sample. However, where Hmielowski et al.'s (2015) samples were *not* representative of any more localized population, our simple random sample of undergraduates at a major southwestern university *does* represent—and is generalizable to—the full undergraduate population from which it draws.[4]

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[3]See Hutchens et al. (2014) for the larger series of items from which these were drawn.
[4]The Hmielowski et al. (2015) results are based on two fairly small, non-representative samples. For one survey, "students from a large public university recruited fellow university students to participate in an online survey as part of a course project" (N=329). The second survey relied on

Especially given the paucity of research on our topic and the utility of examining a youthful

sample, we believe our theorization of predictors of tolerance and our new measure of tolerance

make a substantial contribution while also paving the way for future research on a representative

national sample.

Research Hypotheses

We formulated hypotheses pertaining to four blocks of factors: demographic, political,

media consumption, and online political engagement. Each block further specifies our general

theoretical premise: that just as are other political attitudes and behaviors, tolerance for political

incivility should be shaped by one's prior experiences, socialization, learning, acculturation, and

adaptation to normative expectations. Just as individuals are exposed to differing *partisan*

environments for political socialization, individuals will have been exposed to differing *civility*

environments for political socialization depending upon the various social categories and groups

to which they belong, and the various communication contexts, institutions, and interaction

networks in which they are embedded. Having been acculturated within differing normative

environments, individuals will have learned from and adapted to the differing expectations for

civility characterizing these environments. This in turn will create patterned variability in

tolerance for political incivility. Because prior research suggests exactly how each of our

explanatory factors reflects variability in normative environments for civility, we can

hypothesize the specific effects on tolerance that may be associated with each predictor.

Our first set of potential predictors is demographic.

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a self-selected and non-representative sampling of blog readers of 3 of the top-100 highly
trafficked blogs (n=303). See (citation held for blind review) for full discussion of the checks
made to verify our sample's representativeness and for how our sample demographics compare
to national samples of college students. Discussion of how youth may differ from their elders in
tolerance for political incivility is discussed in our section devoted to research hypotheses.

H1: Females will be less tolerant of political incivility than males.

H2: Older students will be less tolerant of political incivility than younger students.

H3: In-state residents will be more tolerant of political incivility than out-of-state

students.

H1 reflects findings by Fridkin and Kenney (2011), and literature suggesting that women

are socialized to use more deferential, supportive speech than men, while men interrupt more

than women (Anderson & Leaper, 1998; Aries, 1998; Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 1999). H2

reflects findings by Fridkin and Kenney (2011), though our truncated age range (see below)

limits variability on this independent variable, such that we might not find significant effects. H3

reflects that students who are Arizona residents will be acclimated to a disproportionately

conservative political environment relative to students who are residents of many other states,

including California, which supplies a large number of out-of-staters to the population we

sampled. Given research showing that conservatives are more tolerant of incivility (Fridkin &

Kenney, 2011) and that Republicans tend to engage in more negative campaigning than

Democrats (Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Lau & Pomper, 2001, 2004), growing up in a conservative

setting may increase acculturation to, and tolerance for incivility.[5]

Our second block of potential predictors contains political variables.

H4: Liberals will be less tolerant of political incivility than conservatives.

H5: Those with greater political interest will be more tolerant of political incivility than

those with lesser political interest.

H6: Democrats will be less tolerant of political incivility than Republicans.

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[5] Because race and parental education also may create variability in prior civility environments
experienced by survey respondents, we explore whether they are significant predictors of
tolerance for our sample, even though we have no strong basis for making specific predictions
about the direction of effects.

H4 reflects patterns of socialization and acculturation associated with political ideology, including disproportionate liberal emphasis on fair, inclusive debate and sensitivity to racial, ethnic, gender, and sexual slurs. H5 reflects that those with greater political interest attend more to politics and so are more exposed and potentially acclimated to incivility. H6 reflects the strong correlation between partisanship and political ideology. As well—and absent controls for media consumption—to the extent that Republicans select into conservative media environments and Democrats into liberal media environments (Stroud, 2011, Prior, 2013), partisan media selectivity also may undergird H4, because, on average, conservative media are even more uncivil than liberal media (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011).

Our third predictor block involves media consumption.

H7: Those who watch Fox News will be more tolerant of political incivility than those who do not.

H7a: Political partisanship and ideology will interact with media consumption such that those who are conservative or identify as Republicans and also watch Fox News will get a greater boost to their tolerance for political incivility than will others who watch Fox News.

H8: Those who watch MSNBC will be more tolerant of political incivility than those who do not.

H8a: Those who are liberal or identify as Democrats and also watch MSNBC will get a bigger boost to their tolerance for political incivility than will others who watch MSNBC.

H9: Those who listen to Rush Limbaugh will be more tolerant of political incivility than those who do not.

H9a: Those who are conservative or identify as Republicans and also listen to Rush

Limbaugh will get a bigger boost to their tolerance for political incivility than will others

who listen to Limbaugh.

H10: Those who watch The Daily Show will be more tolerant of political incivility than

those who do not.

H11: Those who watch The Colbert Report will be more tolerant of political incivility

than those who do not.

Media consumption hypotheses reflect exposure and acculturation to civility

environments known to be associated with each media outlet. Fox and MSNBC are highly

partisan, with Fox squarely occupying the conservative, and MSNBC the liberal niche (Prior,

2013). Where conservative media's heightened incivility should acculturate its viewers to

incivility and heighten tolerance, liberal media, while less uncivil than conservative media, still

are highly uncivil (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011; see also Jamieson & Cappella, 2008 for high levels

of incivility in Limbaugh's right wing hyper-partisan programming). Viewers of Fox (relative to

non-viewers) should thus be more tolerant of political incivility (H7), as should listeners of

Limbaugh, relative to non-listeners (H9), and viewers of MSNBC, relative to non-viewers (H8).

These effects may be accentuated for those selecting into consuming Fox, MSNBC or Limbaugh

because these match, then reinforce and heighten their own partisanship. (H7a, H8a, H9a; see

DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007; Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2011; Lee & Cappella, 2001;

Levendusky, 2013; Prior, 2013). Though socialization and acculturation may promote less

tolerance of incivility among liberals/Democrats than among conservatives/Republicans (H4 and

H6), intensified partisanship in combination with a steady diet of uncivil, partisan media makes

interaction effects appropriate to hypothesize not just with respect to partisanship/ideology and

conservative media, but also with respect to partisanship/ideology and liberal media.

H10 and H11 likewise draw on the logic of exposure, socialization and acculturation. All

satire news, including *The Daily Show* and *The Colbert Report,* by definition engages in mocking

(Heertrum, 2011; Jones, 2009; McClennon & Maisel, 2014; Tally, 2011), a perceived type of

incivility incorporated into our measures of tolerance. While part of the humor in comedy news

programming is horatian satire, "light and witty" (Holbert, Tcherney, Walther, Esralew, &

Benski, 2013, p. 172), the other part of the humor is juvenlian satire, "savage and merciless"

(Holbert et al., 2013, quoting Sander, 1971, p. 254). Not only can juvenelian satire's bitter, harsh

tone be perceived as uncivil, it also regularly incorporates such specific types of perceived

political incivility as vulgarity, insults, pejorative or demeaning comments, misrepresentation

and exaggeration. Colbert's comedy also is based on parody. He adopts the persona of an arch-

conservative pundit complete with characteristic outrage speech, bullying and incivility

(Wisniewski, 2011; Tally, 2011). Because it is impossible to watch the satire news provided by

Stewart or Colbert without being exposed to substantial incivility, regular viewers may adapt to

the uncivil normative environments provided by these programs by increasing their tolerance for

incivility.[6]

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[6] Here, we also do examine some media consumption factors for which we do not offer specific
hypotheses. These are watching CNN or network news (ABC, CBS or NBC), listening to NPR,
and reading the *Wall Street Journal, New York Times,* or *USA Today. USA Today* typically is
considered a centrist outlet, while the *New York Times* is strongly liberal (Groseclose & Milyo,
2005). Though the *Wall Street Journal* typically is regarded as conservative, there is some
disagreement among researchers employing different ways of assessing partisan slant about
where the *Journal* fits in the political spectrum (compare Groseclose & Milyo, 2005 with
Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2010; see also Gaspar, 2010.). Studies examining the incidence of
incivility in print media have mixed findings (Massaro & Stryker, 2012), so we make no
hypotheses with respect to various newspapers. See Conway & Stryker (2013) for discussion of
the substantive implications of employing different methods to assess partisan slant. Where most
analysts view the above television outlets as relatively non-partisan, centrist or mainstream,

Our fourth predictor block involves online political engagement.

H12: Those who comment on news stories online or who comment on blogs will be more

tolerant of political incivility than those who do not.

H13: Those who e-mail or blog about politics will be more tolerant of political incivility

than those who do not.

H14: Those who participate in online political discussion or visit politically oriented

websites will be more tolerant of political incivility than those who do not.

H12-14 reflect data showing substantial incivility online (e.g., Coe et al., 2014), and

concern that online politics may provide especially uncivil environments (e.g., Papacharissi,

2004; Upadhyay, 2010. Hmeilowski et al., 2015). Assuming that the online engagement we

examine does socialize and acculturate those who participate to incivility, they may presume that

offline, as well as online, incivility is acceptable, increasing their tolerance for incivility.

Data, Methods, and Results

This section explains our methods and analyses. After describing our data, we first focus

on the Latent Class Analyses (LCA) we performed to construct our measure of variable tolerance

for political incivility. We then use this new measure as the dependent variable in a set of

cumulative logistic regressions exploring the factors that shape tolerance.

Data

We collected our data through an online survey administered in 2013 in two separate

waves to a simple random sample of 19,860 undergraduate students at a large southwestern

university. Using the student directory as our sampling frame, the first wave was administered to

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Groseclose & Milyo (2005) do view network news, especially CBS, as liberal. To the extent that
all these television outlets expose viewers to less incivility than do highly partisan television,
radio and online media, they may either have no effect or diminish tolerance by failing to
acculturate viewers to high levels of incivility.

a random sample of 10,000 students on September 30, 2013, while the second wave was

administered to a random sample of 9,860 students on November 6, 2013.[7] Of the 19,860

students selected for inclusion in our sample, 1,218 respondents completed our civility battery,

yielding a response rate of approximately 6.1%. After omitting international students to control

for differences in cross-national conceptualizations of civility and removing respondents who

responded "No Opinion" to civility items included in our LCA, our sample size was n=1,035.

Though representative of the population from which it was drawn, we used weights to correct for

minor differing probabilities of selection into our sample by demographic characteristics.

Latent Class Analysis (LCA): Methods of Analysis

LCA, a form of latent variable analysis, offers an ideal tool to identify and distinguish

among different "types" of respondents who differ systematically in their attitudes about the

incivility of a large number of behaviors in politics. LCA treats the latent variable sought as

categorical and tries to measure it using a series of observed nominal or ordinal indicators. The

observed data is used to determine the probability that survey respondents would have provided

particular response patterns conditioned upon their membership in class T of some latent variable

Y (Clogg, 1995; Magdison & Vermunt, 2003, 2004; McCutcheon, 1987). Based on these results,

LCA segments the data into different groups or latent classes with similar profiles. Practically

speaking, LCA allows us to identify groups of respondents who share similar views of the

civility/incivility of diverse speech/behavior in politics.

To estimate our latent class models, we used items asking respondents to use a 5-point

Likert scale ranging from a value of 0 ("Not at All Uncivil") to 4 ("Very Uncivil") to rate the

level of incivility of the 23 different types of speech or behavior described previously and

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[7] The smaller number of students included in the second wave (less 140) represents a correction
based on the greater probability that the remaining students would be randomly selected.

detailed in Table 1. We eliminated three items—threatening harm, encouraging others to threaten

harm, and using racial, ethnic, gender or sexual slurs—from the LCA providing the basis for our

measure of tolerance. We did so because, in contrast to much more extensive variability

observed on all other items, respondents' attitudes on these three items exhibited extremely

limited variability, with over 80% of respondents rating these behaviors as very uncivil.

Unsurprisingly then, initial analyses suggested these items did not discriminate well across our

latent classes. In addition, using all 23 items as input for the LCA resulted in models that failed

to converge on a global solution, so that replicability could not be assured. Eliminating the three

items solved these problems and left us with 20 indicator variables for our LCA.[8] Because of the

skewed or j-shaped distributions of many of these 20 indicators, we treated them as nominal

variables despite their original ordinal scale.[9] Treating them as nominal meant in turn that we

used Bayes constants in all of our LCA models to help address sparse data issues, prevent

boundary parameter estimates, and ensure that the models converged.

Latest Class Analyses: Results

Table 2 provides the BIC, AIC, and CAIC statistics for our LCAs using both weighted

and unweighted data. It shows that a four-class model fits the data best.[10] The four latent class

profiles (see Appendix A) show that our respondents differ only in terms of the *degree* to which

they find a particular action uncivil as opposed to *what* they consider civil/uncivil. Examining

first the extremity of responses (rather than the proportion of respondents assigned to each class),

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[8] The 20 indicators included the item assessing issue-based attacks. Although the majority of our respondents did not find issue-based attacks uncivil, this item provided useful variability as input for our LCA.

[9] We did try LCA treating the 20 indicators as ordinal, but our results did not match results treating the 20 items as nominal. We used the model treating the indicators as nominal, because it requires fewer assumptions and is more consistent with the behavior of our data.

[10] Reliance on only the AIC, which may overfit and prefer unnecessary complexity, would have suggested a six-class model. However, the BIC and CAIC converge in indicating that the more parsimonious four-class model is the best fitting model.

and moving from Class 1 to Class 4, there is a clear downward shift in the percentage of persons

stating that a given action is "Very Uncivil." This suggests that our latent classes may capture a

single underlying tolerance continuum that is driving observed differences in responses to each

input item. Indeed, the distribution of respondents across the latent classes approximates a

normal curve, with the majority of our respondents—about 37.3%—assigned to the "moderate

tolerance" class (Class 2). This group is flanked by the approximately 29.5% of respondents

assigned to the "low tolerance" class (Class 1), and the approximately 27.9% of respondents

assigned to the "high tolerance" class (Class 3). The 5.4% of respondents who are extremely

tolerant—far more tolerant even than those in Class 3—are assigned to Class 4 and appear to

represent the right tail of a tolerance continuum.

Cumulative Logit Models: Methods of Analysis and Measures

We then modeled predictors of tolerance for political incivility, using our LCA-based,

newly constructed tolerance measure as the dependent variable in a series of cumulative logit

models designed to examine our hypotheses. Consistent with our goal of constructing a measure

of tolerance that reflected respondents' variable responses to many different specific types of

speech and behavior, we assigned all respondents to one of the four latent classes produced by

our best fitting model specification in the LCA.[11] We did this based on the posterior probabilities

produced by the LCA best fitting model such that each respondent was assigned to the latent

class (1-4) for which he/she had the highest predicted probability. That is, respondents were

assigned to their *modal classification*.[12] This resulted in a four category dependent variable: 1 =

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[11] Because the weighted and unweighted data converged on the same model, for simplicity, we
used the unweighted data in the construction of this variable.

[12] Misclassification scores for our LCA model are quite low. The mean predicted probabilities of
being assigned to a given model classification are 0.92 or higher, and the predicted probabilities
of membership in a given latent class exceed 0.75 for 90% of cases in our data. These suggest
that our LCA did a very good job of grouping individuals based on their observed response

low tolerance; 2 = moderate tolerance; 3 = high tolerance; and 4 = extreme tolerance.[13] Given the

strong evidence of monotonic increase in tolerance as we move from category 1 to category 4,

we treat our new dependent variable as ordinal and estimate a series of cumulative logit models.

Cumulative logit models estimate logistic regressions that compare the probability of

being in the $Y \leq j$ category to the probability of being in the $Y > j$ to J categories, where j is the

jth response category of an ordinal variable with 1, ..., J categories. This process is repeated for

all $J - 1$ comparisons. Substantively speaking, this means that we estimated the probability that

any given survey respondent would be in the: 1) low vs. high, moderate and extreme categories;

2) low and moderate vs. high and extreme categories; and 3) low, moderate and high vs. the

extreme category. Our models assume that the effect of a particular independent variable on the

outcome in question—in our case, tolerance for political incivility—is the *same* across all the

comparisons made. This is called the proportional odds assumption, meaning that the response

curves for the different comparisons parallel each other. When this assumption holds, contrast-

specific intercepts still must be estimated. Non-significant score tests (not presented here)

showed that each of our different model specifications met the proportional odds assumption,

and that the cumulative logit model did indeed fit the data. The coefficients for the effects of our

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patterns, such that measurement error is relatively low. To the extent that we do introduce measurement error, it should work to downwardly bias estimates of the explanatory impact of independent variables examined in our logistic regressions, and thus make it harder, rather than easier, to find significant effects.

[13] Even when there are low misclassification scores, some statisticians counsel that the ideal approach to explanatory modeling with latent variables is to simultaneously model measurement and explanatory models, ensuring that parameter estimates are not downwardly biased (Bakk, Tekle, & Vermunt, 2013). However, had we used a one-step procedure to estimate both measurement and structural components in an explanatory logistic regression, we would have exacerbated sparse data to the point where we could not have arrived at a unique solution. The strategy we followed allowed us to arrive at a unique solution for the LCA, and to use the maximum number of respondents for the LCA, rather than being restricted to respondents who answered not just the civility items but also all the questions used to create independent variables for the logistic regression. Creating a separate tolerance variable for our data set also facilitates the work of other researchers who may want to replicate our results.

independent variables in the models below can be interpreted as the increase or decrease in the

cumulative log-odds—or when exponentiated, odds—that an individual would exhibit a lower

vs. higher level of tolerance for political incivility.

We used likelihood ratio tests (LRTs) and the Akaike and Bayesian information criterion

(AIC and BIC) in comparing models to identify the best-fitting model specification for our data.

Once we identified the best fitting model, we used family wise Wald χ^2 tests for independent

variables with multiple categories. These tests account for the problem of multiple comparisons

and determine which covariates are statistically significant predictors of a respondent's tolerance

for political incivility.

For our explanatory analyses, we focus on respondents in our LCA who also completed

the survey in its entirety, so that they answered questions pertaining to our independent variables

as well as to our dependent variable. This reduced our sample size from n=1,035 to those 891

students who were U.S. citizens, did not provide a response of "No Opinion" on our 20

indicators of political incivility, and completed the entire survey. Following listwise deletion of

additional cases of missing data on any independent variable used in our models, our final

sample size for the cumulative logit models was $n = 831$. In all our models, we employed

manually iterated, post-stratification weights to account for differences in the probability of

selection into our survey across key demographic groups and to ensure that our results are

representative of the attitudes of our student population as a whole.

We divided our independent variables into four blocks corresponding to the blocks of

explanatory factors in our research hypotheses: demographic factors, political factors, media

consumption, and online political engagement. Our demographic variable block includes the

respondent's age (dichotomized to distinguish between 18-29 year-olds and those respondents

age 30 or older), sex (female (0) versus male (1)), race (white (0) versus non-white (1)), whether

or not the respondent was an Arizona resident (in state (0) versus out of state (1)), and parents'

education (no college (0), one parent with some college education or higher (1), both parents

with some college education or higher (2)). These variables allow us to test H1-H3. Our political

variable block includes political ideology (extremely liberal (1) to extremely conservative (7)),

interest (not very interested (1), somewhat interested (2), and very much interested (3)), and

partisan affiliation (Republican (1), Independent (2, reference category), Democrat (3)), allowing

us to test H4-H6.

Our media consumption block contains measures of exposure to television programming,

including network news (ABC, NBC, and CBS), CNN, FOX News, MSNBC, The Daily Show,

and The Colbert Report). It also includes measures of exposure to the *New York Times*, *Wall*

Street Journal and *USA Today*, measures of exposure to the radio programming of NPR and

Rush Limbaugh, and a series of dummy variables measuring a respondent's exposure to liberal

(e.g., *The Huffington Post*, *Daily Kos*, *Slate*, and *FiveThirtyEight*), conservative (e.g., *The*

Drudge Report, *TownHall*), or both liberal and conservative online news sources, with exposure

to neither liberal or conservative news sources coded as the reference category. To minimize

measurement error due to faulty recall, we measured exposure to TV news and newspapers over

the last week, coding those who had no exposure as "0" and those who were exposed one or

more days as "1." For exposure to NPR, the Rush Limbaugh Show, and liberal and conservative

online news sources, we had to use average weekly exposure over the past year, but we likewise

recoded to contrast those with no exposure, given a "0", and those who were exposed one or

more days, given a "1". To test H8a, H9a, and H10a, we interacted our measures of exposure to

FOX News, MSNBC and Rush Limbaugh (media consumption block factors) with our measures

of political ideology and partisan affiliation (political block factors).

Finally, our online engagement block consists of three dummy variables which measure

whether or not a respondent has: 1) posted comments on a news story or blog on a political issue

(0 = no); 2) e-mailed or blogged about some political issue (0 = no); or 3) participated in online

political discussion or visited a politically-oriented website over the last year (0 = no).

Cumulative Logit Models: Results

Table 3, presenting the likelihood tests and AIC and BIC statistics for all the models we

examined, shows that the best performing model for our data is one that includes all four blocks

of independent variables. We label this the "Full Model." As Table 3 shows, while the Snell and

Nagelkerke pseudo-R^2 statistics indicated that a model containing all four covariate blocks plus

the examined interaction effects performs better, the likelihood ratio tests for comparisons of the

Full Model to the Full Model plus interactions are non-significant. In addition, familywise Wald

χ^2 tests (available from the authors on request) show that, although the interaction between party

affiliation and exposure to FOX News was marginally significant (.$p \leq .10$),[14] all other

interactions were statistically insignificant. All these diagnostics, taken together, suggest that

H7a, H8a and H9a are not supported by our data.

Shifting attention to the results of our best fitting model then, the familywise Wald χ^2

tests indicate that just seven of the 23 independent variables included in this model were

statistically significant predictors of our respondents' tolerance for incivility ($p \leq 0.05$). One

additional variable (Colbert Report viewership) was marginally significant at the $p \leq 0.10$ level.

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[14]With greater statistical power, this interaction effect may have been significant. However, the
effect is not consistent with the logic of H7a. The increased tolerance for political incivility
associated with exposure to FOX News is *not* more heightened for Republicans (relative to the
reference group of Independents), but it *is* more heightened for Democrats (relative to the
reference group of Independents).

Table 4 shows the effects sizes and directions for all our independent variables, with

significance levels noted. Among demographic variables, only sex is a significant predictor of

tolerance for incivility, with women being 1.21 times *more* likely than their male peers to

express *low* vs. moderate, high and extreme, *low and moderate* vs. high and extreme; and *low,*

moderate, and high vs. extreme tolerance for incivility. H2 is supported; H1 and H3 are not.

Given our truncated age distribution, however, H1 might be supported for data containing a

substantial number of persons over age 50.

Among political factors, Republicans are 0.68 *less* likely than Independents to express a

lower versus higher tolerance for incivility. The opposite is true for Democrats, who are 1.22

times *more* likely than their independent peers to express a *lower* tolerance for incivility at the

$p \leq 0.10$ level. H6 is supported, but H4 and H5 are not. With political partisanship in the model,

the effect of political ideology washes out. Of course, partisanship and ideology are correlated,

with Republicans more conservative, Democrats more liberal, and Independents more moderate.

Controlling for many other more direct measures of exposure and acclimation to political

incivility, enhanced political interest does not increase tolerance.

Among media consumption factors, H7 and H10 are supported by the data, but the other

hypotheses do not receive support. Indeed, three significant effects in this group are striking for

being in the opposite direction than we hypothesized. Consistent with our hypotheses, and

controlling for all other predictive factors in the model, including political partisanship,[15]

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[15] Absent controls for partisanship, it could be possible that apparent media consumption effects instead are due to partisan selectivity, with Republicans, who are more tolerant of incivility, disproportionately selecting into FOX News and Democrats, who are less tolerant, disproportionately selecting into MSNBC (Stroud 2011). However, Prior's (2013) careful analytic review of pertinent research suggests that partisan selectivity is not very prevalent, characterizing only the 10-15% of the population that are the most highly partisan. Indeed, in our data, partisan affiliation does *not* mediate the impact of media consumption. Parameter estimates produced by a model containing media consumption factors alone, and parameters for the full

respondents who watched FOX News are 0.70 times *less* likely to express a *lower* versus higher

tolerance for incivility than respondents who did not watch FOX News. Similarly, respondents

who watched The Daily Show, relative to those who did not, are .66 *less* likely to express a

lower vs. higher tolerance for political incivility. We did not have an a priori hypothesis for

listening to NPR, but these respondents are 1.46 times *more* likely than respondents who did not

listen to NPR, to express a *lower* vs, higher tolerance for incivility. The NPR effect does fit our

overarching "different civility environments" logic. Tending toward civility rather than incivility,

consuming NPR would not acculturate listeners to incivility.

In contrast, however, and controlling for all other predictive factors in our best fitting

model, respondents who watched MSNBC are 1.35 *more* likely to express a *lower* versus higher

tolerance for incivility, although this effect was marginally significant ($p \leq 0.10$). Respondents

who listened to Rush Limbaugh are 2.10 times *more* likely, relative to those who did not, to

express *lower* vs. higher tolerance for incivility.[16] Those who watched *The Colbert Report*,

relative to those who did not, likewise are *more* vs. less likely to express a *lower* vs. higher

tolerance for political incivility, though this effect was significant only at the $p \leq 0.10$ level.

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model specification—which included partisanship—, were comparable and the estimated
covariance parameters between partisanship and the media consumption factors were weak.
[16] Sparse data concerns led us to examine carefully all cross-classifications of media
consumption factors with the dependent variable and various covariates. We did find that, among
those 41 respondents who expressed the most extreme tolerance for political incivility, *none*
listened to Rush Limbaugh, creating a zero cell in the cross-classification of tolerance for
political incivility with exposure to Limbaugh. Given this could have produced boundary
estimates or contributed to instability in parameter estimates, we compared cumulative logit
models including and excluding these 41 respondents. With the "extremely tolerant" category of
the dependent variable included, the Limbaugh effect increased from 0.5352 to 0.7424, and
moved from marginal significance to statistical significance. Overall, model results remained the
same and the other parameter estimates remained substantially the same whether the extreme
category was included or excluded. The substantive implications of the two models (extreme
category included and excluded) are the same.

At least for our respondents, exposure to partisan media and satire news are *not* invariably associated with increased tolerance for political incivility. Instead, the effects of such exposure are more program-specific.

Finally, among variables pertaining to online political engagement, for our data, only one of these was a statistically significant predictor of tolerance for political incivility. Respondents who participated in online political discussion were .62 *less* likely compared to respondents who did not, to express lower vs. higher levels of tolerance. This supports H14. However, H12 and H13 are not supported. Where online political discussion may involve individuals in heated debates, such that they experience, engage in and are acculturated to political incivility (see Hmielowski et al, 2015), forms of online engagement that are more passive or for which actors can choose *not* to be exposed to further discussion or comments may not produce the acculturation that increases tolerance.

`   **Discussion and Conclusion**

Our examination of predictors of tolerance for political incivility makes contributions to conceptualizing and measuring tolerance. It also enhances knowledge of factors associated with variable tolerance, and it opens new issues and avenues for further research.

With respect to conceptualizing and measuring tolerance, we demonstrated the utility of using latent class analysis to construct a measure of tolerance based on a large number of survey questions, each of which taps into a specific type of perceived political incivility. Using this improved measure, we were able to examine almost all the factors that Fridkin and Kenney (2011) found to shape tolerance among a sample of respondents in 21 states with Senate races. We also investigated additional explanatory factors pertaining to media consumption and online political engagement.

Of the factors examined by Fridkin and Kenney (2011), only sex was similarly related to tolerance among our population of undergraduates, with women being less tolerant of political incivility than men. In contrast to findings of Fridkin and Kenney (2011), for our sample, political partisanship, rather political ideology, predicted tolerance. However, because there is a close association between ideology and partisanship, the general substantive implication—that those on the right are more tolerant of political incivility than those on the left—remains consistent across the two studies and their differing populations. Though age had no impact for our population, we suspect this is because of our highly truncated age distribution. In future research using a representative national sample, we will measure tolerance as we did here and re-examine the impact on tolerance of a full range of demographic and political factors. We also will examine the impact of religion and religiosity, which we were not able to do here.

Our study is the first to demonstrate empirically the relevance of media consumption and participating in online political discussion to explaining variable tolerance for political incivility. Because the study is cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, we cannot be sure to what degree media consumption and participating in online political discussion predict tolerance for incivility or vice versa. Future longitudinal research is needed to tease out causal ordering and the degree to which reciprocal causation is present. We have, however, shown important empirical associations that merit future research and raise additional theoretical and empirical questions.

While our findings with respect to participating in online political discussion, and watching Fox News and The Daily Show, confirmed our hypotheses, the significant effects of listening to Rush Limbaugh, and watching MSNBC and the Colbert Report, were in the opposite direction of our predictions. For our population at least, exposure to these media outlets was

associated with reduced, rather than enhanced tolerance for incivility, despite the fact that all

these venues, and especially Limbaugh and Colbert, expose viewers to substantial incivility.

It could be that our unifying theoretical premise is faulty, and that uncivil normative

environments do not necessarily socialize or acculturate individuals to the acceptability of

political incivility. However, our unexpected media results also could be due to the bluntness of

our measures. All we could do reliably with our data was distinguish those who were *not*

exposed to particular partisan or satire programming at all vs. those who had *some* exposure.

We could not distinguish between those who consumed small amounts vs. those who made it a

steady diet. Where a steady diet of partisan or satire media consumed over long duration may in

fact acculturate consumers to incivility and increase their tolerance for it, more intermittent or

brief exposure could shock or dishearten viewers, in turn decreasing their tolerance. Future

research should seek to distinguish reliably among such different consumption patterns.

It could also be that different types of satire promote different reactions. Both Stewart

and Colbert immerse listeners in an uncivil communication environment, but Colbert's parody of

a conservative pundit also demonstrates bombastic intolerance for alternative points of view. As

Colbert (in persona) noted: "It's one thing to express your views. It's another thing for those

views to be different from mine" (quoted in Wisnieuski, 2011, pp. 171-72). Stewart too has a

point of view, but highlights foibles of liberal as well as conservative politicians, and gives air

time to conservative as well as liberal guests. In short, perhaps the uncivil environment

characterizing both Stewart's and Colbert's satire breeds acculturation and tolerance for

incivility only when it is *not* accompanied by parody that, in associating incivility with blatant

intolerance of other points of view, paradoxically can reinforce, rather than undercut civility

norms. Future experimental research could be designed to examine this idea

However, that our findings for consumption of Rush Limbaugh's programming are so counter to expectations, reinforces the need for future research with media consumption variables that allow us to measure the full range of exposure and different thresholds of cumulative exposure to diverse media outlets. In addition, our measure of exposure to Rush was highly skewed, with only about 7% of respondents who had some exposure. It also was especially prone to measurement error because it measured average weekly exposure over the last year, rather than over the last week, as we were able to do for Fox, Stewart, Colbert and MSNBC. It is quite possible that future research with measures that more directly, reliably, and precisely reflect our unifying premise of acculturation would produce results more consistent with our unifying theoretical framework. And of course we need research for a representative national sample.

Despite the limitations of the current study, its key contributions remain intact. The strong measure of tolerance for political incivility, and the LCA methods we use to create it, can be incorporated to strengthen future research. As well, we have opened a new avenue of research relating media consumption patterns to variable tolerance for political incivility. Though it was not fully supported by our findings, our explicit unified theoretical frame can serve as a starting point for further theoretical specification and hypothesis testing research on a representative national sample of voting age Americans. Finally, the interpretive suggestions we offered with respect to findings that failed to confirm our initial hypotheses likewise can stimulate further research on how exposure to different types of political satire, and occasional vs. regular consumption of partisan media, may shape variable tolerance for political incivility.

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Table 1: Incivility survey measures

Original question	Variable name
Use of obscene or vulgar language in political discourse	Vulgarity
Making disrespectful statements in a political discussion	Disrespect
Interrupting those with whom one disagrees in a political discussion	Interrupt
Name calling or using derogatory language to express distaste or contempt for one's political opponent.	Name Calling
Intentionally making false or misleading statements in a political discussion.	Mislead
Refusing to let those with whom one disagrees take part in a political discussion.	Prevent Discussion
Shouting at a political opponent.	Shout
Attacking a political opponent's personal character or conduct.	Attack Character
Attacking a political opponent's stand on the issues.	Attack Issues
Failing to provide reasons and evidence to support one's opinion in a political discussion.	No Evidence
Making exaggerated statements that misrepresent or obscure the truth in a political debate.	Exaggerate
Mocking or making fun of one's political opponents.	Make Fun
Engaging in character assassination in a political discussion to make an opponent look bad.	Attack Reputation
Using insulting language in a political discussion.	Insult
Repeatedly emphasizing minor flubs, oversights, or improprieties of a political opponent.	Highlight Flubs
Verbal fighting or jousting with a political opponent.	Verbal Joust
Rolling one's eyes while a political opponent is speaking.	Roll Eyes
Getting in an opponent's face during a political discussion.	Violate Space
Demonizing an opponent during a political discussion.	Demonize
Refusing to listen to argument or points of view with which one disagrees in a political discussion.	Refuse to Listen

Note: The prompt for the above questions read: "Recently there has been much talk about the nature of political discussion among political media elites and among ordinary citizens. Some people think political discussion has become uncivil. Others think it is civil. For each of the following statements, please consider whether it is civil or uncivil and mark the response that most accurately reflects your opinion.

Table 2: Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Latent Class Analyses

Unweighted Sample	-2LL	BIC	AIC	CAIC	# of Parameters	Classification Error
1-Class Model	53074.83	53630.20	53234.83	53710.20	80	0.0000
2-Class Model	47981.14	49098.82	48303.14	49259.82	161	0.0230
3-Class Model	46217.45	47897.45	46701.45	48139.45	242	0.0419
4-Class Model	45261.63	47503.95	45907.63	47826.95	323	0.0572
5-Class Model	44816.91	47621.54	45624.91	48025.54	404	0.0794
6-Class Model	44456.05	47822.99	45426.05	48307.99	485	0.0953
Weighted Sample	-2LL	BIC	AIC	CAIC	# of Parameters	Classification Error
1-Class Model	53694.83	54250.20	53854.83	54330.20	80	0.0000
2-Class Model	48424.00	49541.69	48746.00	49702.69	161	0.0213
3-Class Model	46624.10	48304.10	47108.10	48546.10	242	0.0404
4-Class Model	45694.66	47936.97	46340.66	48259.97	323	0.0527
5-Class Model	45268.18	48072.81	46076.18	48476.81	404	0.0761
6-Class Model	44870.64	48237.59	45840.64	48722.59	485	0.0880

[a] Grey-filled cells are used to indicate the best-fitting model specification.

Table 3: Goodness-of-Fit Statistics and Likelihood Ratio Statistics for Different Cumulative Logit Model Specifications, n=831

Model	ID#	-2LL	# of Parameters	Contrast	χ^2	D. F.	P-Value	AIC	BIC	R2	Max Rescaled R2
Intercept	[1]	2048.166	0					2054.166	2068.334		
Demographics	[2]	2032.646	6	[1] vs. [2]	15.52	6	0.0166	2050.646	2093.150	0.0185	0.0202
Demographics + Politics	[3]	2016.122	11	[1] vs. [3]	32.04	11	0.0008	2044.122	2110.238	0.0378	0.0413
				[2] vs. [3]	16.52	5	0.0055				
Demographics + Politics + Media	[4]	1985.576	25	[1] vs. [4]	62.59	25	0.0000	2041.576	2173.810	0.0726	0.0793
				[2] vs. [4]	47.07	19	0.0003				
				[3] vs. [4]	30.55	14	0.0064				
Demographics + Politics + Media + Political Activities (Full Model)	[5]	1969.802	28	[1] vs. [6]	78.36	28	0.0000	2031.802	2178.204	0.09	0.0984
				[2] vs. [6]	62.84	22	0.0000				
				[3] vs. [6]	46.32	17	0.0002				
				[4] vs. [6]	15.77	3	0.0013				
				[5] vs. [6]	33.80	14	0.0022				
Interaction Model	[6]	1954.456	37	[1] vs. [7]	93.71	37	0.0000	2032.024	2206.761	0.1066	0.1166
				[2] vs. [7]	78.19	31	0.0000				
				[3] vs. [7]	61.67	26	0.0001				
				[4] vs. [7]	31.12	12	0.0019				
				[5] vs. [7]	49.15	23	0.0012				
				[6] vs. [7]	15.35	9	0.0819				

Table 4: Parameter Estimates for Cumulative Logit Models, n=831

	Demographics		Demographics + Politics		Demographics + Politics + Media		Demographics + Politics + Media + Online Participation	
	B	EXP(B)	**B**	EXP(B)	**B**	EXP(B)	**B**	EXP(B)
Intercept- Cut Point 1 (Low vs. Moderate, High, & Extreme)	-0.96*** (0.14)	0.38	-1.21*** (0.25)	0.30	-1.32*** (0.32)	0.27	-1.13*** (0.32)	0.32
Intercept- Cut Point 2 (Low & Moderate vs. High & Extreme	0.64*** (0.14)	1.89	0.41† (0.25)	1.51	0.35 (0.32)	1.42	0.56† (0.32)	1.76
Intercept- Cut Point 3 (Low, Moderate, & High vs. Extreme)	3.01*** (0.20)	20.37	2.82*** (0.28)	16.69	2.79*** (0.35)	16.35	3.03*** (0.35)	20.72
30 Years of Age or Older	-0.01 (0.12)	0.99	-0.03 (0.12)	0.97	-0.00 (0.12)	1.00	-0.01 (0.12)	0.99
Female	0.23*** (0.07)	1.26	0.23*** (0.07)	1.26	0.21** (0.07)	1.23	0.19** (0.07)	1.21
Nonwhite	-0.03 (0.07)	0.97	-0.07 (0.07)	0.94	-0.06 (0.07)	0.94	-0.08 (0.07)	0.92
In-State Student	-0.06 (0.07)	0.94	-0.04 (0.07)	0.96	0.00 (0.07)	1.00	-0.00 (0.07)	1.00
One Parent College Graduate	-0.08 (0.12)	0.93	-0.07 (0.12)	0.93	-0.08 (0.12)	0.93	-0.08 (0.12)	0.92
Both Parents College Graduates	-0.10 (0.10)	0.91	-0.09 (0.10)	0.92	-0.13 (0.10)	0.88	-0.12 (0.10)	0.89
Republican			-0.45*** (0.13)	0.64	-0.40** (0.13)	0.67	-0.38** (0.14)	0.68
Democrat			0.25 (0.12)	1.28	0.20† (0.12)	1.23	0.20† (0.12)	1.22
Ideology			0.04 (0.06)	1.04	0.06 (0.06)	1.06	0.04 (0.06)	1.04
Somewhat Interested in Politics			-0.02 (0.09)	0.98	-0.01 (0.09)	0.99	-0.05 (0.09)	0.96
Very Interested in Politics			0.10 (0.10)	1.10	0.04 (0.11)	1.04	0.19 (0.12)	1.21
Watched Network News					-0.12 (0.16)	0.89	-0.16 (0.16)	0.85
Watched FOX News					-0.34* (0.17)	0.71	-0.36* (0.17)	0.70

Table 4: Parameter Estimates for Cumulative Logit Models, n=831 (Cont'd)

	Demographics		Demographics + Politics		Demographics + Politics + Media		Demographics + Politics + Media + Online Participation	
	B	EXP(B)	B	EXP(B)	B	EXP(B)	B	EXP(B)
Watched MSNBC					0.26 (0.17)	1.30	0.30† (0.17)	1.35
Watched CNN					-0.01 (0.16)	0.99	-0.00 (0.16)	1.00
Watched Colbert Report					0.41* (0.21)	1.50	0.39† (0.21)	1.47
Watched Daily Show					-0.47* (0.21)	0.62	-0.42* (0.21)	0.66
Read Wall Street Journal					-0.25 (0.16)	0.78	-0.21 (0.16)	0.81
Read New York Times					0.10 (0.16)	1.11	0.14 (0.16)	1.15
Read USA Today					-0.13 (0.18)	0.88	-0.15 (0.18)	0.86
Listen Rush Limbaugh					0.65* (0.30)	1.92	0.74* (0.30)	2.10
Listen NPR					0.32* (0.15)	1.37	0.38* (0.15)	1.46
Visited Conservative News Websites					-0.11 (0.32)	0.89	-0.11 (0.32)	0.90
Visited Liberal News Websites					0.07 (0.15)	1.07	0.09 (0.16)	1.09
Visited Both Conservative & Liberal News Websites					-0.12 (0.24)	0.88	-0.14 (0.25)	0.87
Posted Comments							-0.25 (0.17)	0.78
Written Political Blog							-0.05 (0.21)	0.95
Participated in Online Discussion							-0.47** (0.17)	0.62

†=p = 0.10, *=p < 0.05, **=p < 0.01, ***=p < 0.001

Appendix: Latent Class Profile for 4-Class Model Estimated Using Unweighted Data, *n*=1,035

		Low	Moderate	High	Extreme	Marginal Distribution
	Percentage of Respondents Assigned to Latent Class	29.45%	37.28%	27.89%	5.38%	
Vulgarity	Not at all Uncivil	0.41%	0.30%	2.62%	52.13%	3.77%
	Slightly Uncivil	2.74%	2.70%	16.26%	22.12%	7.53%
	Somewhat Uncivil	2.83%	11.37%	24.67%	9.48%	12.46%
	Mostly Uncivil	9.02%	26.52%	28.21%	3.15%	20.58%
	Very Uncivil	85.00%	59.12%	28.24%	13.12%	55.66%
Disrespect	Not at all Uncivil	0.34%	0.02%	0.26%	36.11%	2.12%
	Slightly Uncivil	0.35%	0.38%	6.10%	30.21%	3.57%
	Somewhat Uncivil	1.14%	5.49%	31.66%	16.00%	12.08%
	Mostly Uncivil	6.24%	35.03%	39.15%	6.81%	26.18%
	Very Uncivil	91.93%	59.07%	22.82%	10.87%	56.04%
Interrupt	Not at all Uncivil	0.03%	0.02%	2.08%	32.01%	2.32%
	Slightly Uncivil	1.13%	3.61%	25.05%	27.47%	10.14%
	Somewhat Uncivil	4.36%	24.75%	37.85%	19.69%	22.13%
	Mostly Uncivil	23.76%	50.44%	22.71%	15.07%	32.95%
	Very Uncivil	70.72%	21.18%	12.31%	5.76%	32.46%
Name Calling	Not at all Uncivil	0.02%	0.27%	0.02%	31.98%	1.83%
	Slightly Uncivil	0.04%	0.36%	4.88%	29.46%	3.09%
	Somewhat Uncivil	0.43%	1.65%	22.93%	14.54%	7.92%
	Mostly Uncivil	2.02%	22.90%	39.97%	5.54%	20.58%
	Very Uncivil	97.49%	74.81%	32.19%	18.48%	66.58%
Mislead	Not at all Uncivil	0.03%	0.28%	0.41%	35.26%	2.12%
	Slightly Uncivil	0.03%	1.06%	6.13%	10.93%	2.70%
	Somewhat Uncivil	0.49%	6.27%	14.90%	13.10%	7.34%
	Mostly Uncivil	6.49%	30.72%	32.47%	14.26%	23.19%
	Very Uncivil	92.96%	61.67%	46.09%	26.45%	64.64%

		Low	Moderate	High	Extreme	Marginal Distribution
Prevent Discussion	Not at all Uncivil	0.68%	1.11%	0.64%	37.34%	2.80%
	Slightly Uncivil	0.03%	0.30%	5.74%	14.68%	2.51%
	Somewhat Uncivil	1.58%	7.14%	16.42%	11.16%	8.31%
	Mostly Uncivil	8.43%	32.47%	30.30%	22.52%	24.25%
	Very Uncivil	89.28%	58.98%	46.90%	14.29%	62.13%
Shout	Not at all Uncivil	0.29%	0.21%	2.91%	37.51%	2.99%
	Slightly Uncivil	1.31%	4.08%	25.78%	42.80%	11.40%
	Somewhat Uncivil	3.57%	18.93%	35.91%	15.14%	18.94%
	Mostly Uncivil	15.08%	39.51%	25.15%	1.80%	26.28%
	Very Uncivil	79.75%	37.27%	10.26%	2.75%	40.39%
Attack Character	Not at all Uncivil	0.08%	1.09%	9.55%	41.22%	5.31%
	Slightly Uncivil	0.56%	5.10%	14.37%	21.75%	7.25%
	Somewhat Uncivil	6.14%	18.38%	38.97%	21.31%	20.68%
	Mostly Uncivil	17.84%	39.80%	25.56%	9.48%	27.73%
	Very Uncivil	75.38%	35.62%	11.55%	6.24%	39.04%
Attack Issues	Not at all Uncivil	16.63%	28.74%	63.41%	63.55%	36.72%
	Slightly Uncivil	11.94%	27.55%	18.25%	19.05%	19.90%
	Somewhat Uncivil	19.02%	22.36%	10.80%	8.23%	17.39%
	Mostly Uncivil	23.79%	15.72%	5.59%	6.66%	14.78%
	Very Uncivil	28.61%	5.63%	1.96%	2.51%	11.21%
No Evidence	Not at all Uncivil	4.08%	5.48%	20.28%	42.94%	11.21%
	Slightly Uncivil	1.48%	13.84%	17.00%	19.75%	11.40%
	Somewhat Uncivil	14.22%	32.88%	24.91%	15.95%	24.25%
	Mostly Uncivil	29.77%	31.55%	21.77%	10.29%	27.15%
	Very Uncivil	50.46%	16.26%	16.04%	11.08%	25.99%

		Low	Moderate	High	Extreme	Marginal Distribution
Exaggerate	Not at all Uncivil	0.36%	0.03%	2.46%	37.18%	2.80%
	Slightly Uncivil	0.07%	2.56%	11.82%	23.01%	5.51%
	Somewhat Uncivil	3.05%	13.85%	32.74%	13.92%	15.94%
	Mostly Uncivil	15.46%	46.53%	30.82%	9.61%	31.01%
	Very Uncivil	81.06%	37.03%	22.17%	16.29%	44.74%
Make Fun	Not at all Uncivil	0.04%	0.03%	2.27%	43.50%	2.99%
	Slightly Uncivil	0.10%	2.29%	18.18%	36.57%	7.92%
	Somewhat Uncivil	2.06%	9.98%	36.34%	13.07%	15.17%
	Mostly Uncivil	9.57%	39.84%	29.48%	1.81%	25.99%
	Very Uncivil	88.23%	47.86%	13.73%	5.05%	47.93%
Attack Reputation	Not at all Uncivil	0.36%	0.26%	0.03%	30.20%	1.84%
	Slightly Uncivil	0.05%	1.39%	7.23%	35.21%	4.44%
	Somewhat Uncivil	1.38%	5.17%	30.09%	7.07%	11.11%
	Mostly Uncivil	6.81%	38.39%	37.02%	14.79%	27.44%
	Very Uncivil	91.39%	54.79%	25.63%	12.73%	55.17%
Insult	Not at all Uncivil	0.35%	0.03%	0.72%	39.01%	2.41%
	Slightly Uncivil	0.35%	0.04%	6.01%	27.72%	3.28%
	Somewhat Uncivil	1.24%	6.68%	28.73%	18.86%	11.88%
	Mostly Uncivil	6.42%	34.99%	39.98%	1.80%	26.18%
	Very Uncivil	91.64%	58.27%	24.56%	12.60%	56.24%
Highlight Flubs	Not at all Uncivil	0.79%	1.48%	8.22%	34.36%	4.93%
	Slightly Uncivil	4.12%	7.24%	29.43%	31.55%	13.82%
	Somewhat Uncivil	11.81%	32.16%	39.78%	21.71%	27.73%
	Mostly Uncivil	30.73%	49.03%	18.07%	9.00%	32.85%
	Very Uncivil	52.56%	10.08%	4.51%	3.39%	20.68%